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contractor. The relationship of the distribution of papers to the publi-
cation of the paper is so closely allied that any risk of injury by or to
the carrier should be placed on the publisher. Any economic loss to
the publisher occasioned by this policy can be distributed among the
readers in the form of a slightly higher subscription price or daily
rate. This would comport with one of the most widely recognized
justifications for vicarious liability, the distribution of risk theory,
which is based on the belief that it is better to spread inevitable losses
among a group than to let such losses fall on a few.35
Fred F. Bradley
REAL PROPERTY-PROMOTING THE MARKETABILITY OF
LAND TITLES
The absence of defects in the record chain of title, freedom from
incumbrances, and title in the vendor are the three factors upon which
the marketability of a land title is generally considered to depend.i
In order to determine whether these factors exist, the lawyer-con-
veyancer must examine the public record of countless transactions af-
fecting the particular land. He must, theoretically at least, verify
title back to the state or federal government. Since a lawyer will
seldom certify a title which is subject to conditions or restrictions or
which contains an apparently fatal record defect, such incumbrances
and defects remain a clog on the title and an impediment to its market-
ability. Such titles remain unmarketable so long as such incum-
brances and defects are valid of record, even though the person having
the right of enforcement may be totally ignorant of the existence of
such right.
In an effort to solve the problem of old title incumbrances and
defects, to establish a reasonable period for title search, and to give
the conveyancer some yardstick by which to appraise a title, the
legislatures of most of the states have, with varying degrees of success,
enacted four principal types of legislation: statutes of limitations,
curative acts, statutes limiting the duration of conditions and restric-
tions, and marketable title acts. In addition, several of the state bar
associations have adopted title standards. Each of the four types of
35 Smith, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444 (1923); also see Baty,
Vicarious Liability 34 (1916) for a discussion of the theory that the employer is
liable because of his "deep pocket."; Harper, "The Basis of the Immunity of an
Employer of an Independent Contractor," 10 Ind. L. J. 494 (1935); Laski, "The
Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 Yale L. J. 105 (1916); Morris, "The Torts of an
Independent Contractor," 29 II. L. Rev. 339 (1934).
13 American Law of Property 130 (Casner ed. 1952).
1958] NOTES
KxNvc c LAw Jo AL[ 4
legislation can be, and often has been, extremely beneficial; neverthe-
less in some areas such legislation has often fallen short of expecta-
tions. This has been due more to the failure of legislatures to recognize
the limitations of the particular legislation than to any inherent
weaknesses of the legislation itself. Each of these four types of legis-
lation is ideally suited to accomplish a desirable result, but no one of
them alone can adequately satisfy the need for improvement in our
conveyancing laws. In proper combination, however, such legislation
can bring an antequated conveyancing procedure up to date and
materially contribute to the marketability of land titles.
It is proposed here to examine separately these four types of legis-
lation, as well as title standards, in order to determine their capabili-
ties and limitations, and to suggest a possible combination of three of
these four types of legislation which it is believed would provide
Kentucky with an excellent program designed to promote the market-
ability of land titles.
Statutes of Limitations
The earliest type of legislation which has proved beneficial in
promoting the marketability of land titles took the form of statutes
of limitations. The usual operation of the statute is to bar the claimant
to a matured interest from the assertion of his remedy after the lapse
of a stated period of time. Thus an adverse possessor becomes the
owner of land by the title holder's failure to assert his possessory right
within the statutory period.
On the surface, it might be supposed that these statutes would be
very useful in providing a good record title. This is true in some
cases. But it is equally true that it cannot always be determined from
an examination of the land records whether a statute of limitations has
operated in fact. Thus, since a new promise to pay an old mortgage
debt may revive the debt and the mortgage, and since such events do
not necessarily appear of record, a mortgage which appears to have
been barred by a statute of limitations may, in reality, constitute a
valid incumbrance on the land. Too, most statutes of limitations do
not run against owners of future interests, persons under disability,
state or governmental units, or charitable uses.2 Such exemptions from
the operation of these statutes, coupled with their essentially negative
nature, account for the failure of statutes of limitations to solve effec-
tively the problems of the marketability of land titles.3
2 Basye, Clearing Land Titles 108 (1953).
3 Ibid.
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Curative Statutes
Curative statutes have been used in some jurisdictions with good
effect in improving the marketability of titles. Generally, the function
of these acts is limited to establishing certain documents of record as
prima facie effective in accomplishing that which they purport to do.4
Thus a deed which was for some technical reason defective when
recorded would, by operation of the statute, be validated ab initio.
As contrasted with statutes of limitations, curative acts are active
and positive in their operation and, within the limited area of their
operation, may render a technically invalid title marketable. But such
statutes do not affect the necessity for the conveyancer to search the
records over an unjustifiably long period. Nor do they affect the old
interests themselves, except perhaps to perfect them, even though
such interests may have been abandoned or have outlived their social
usefulness.
Still, when used in conjunction with other legislation, such statutes
can contribute materially to the marketability of titles.5
Statutes Limiting the Duration of Conditions
Some states have passed legislation which limits the time within
which a condition may work a forfeiture. Others limit the duration
of conditions and restrictions to a maximum specified number of
years. 6 Such limitations are absolute as to all conditions and restric-
tions imposed subsequent to the enactment of the statute.
Probably the most effective, clearly constitutional, legislation of
this type is that of Minnesota which operates prospectively as to all
conditions and restrictions and retroactively as to such conditions and
restrictions as are, or "shall become," merely nominal.7
Legislation of this type is undoubtedly useful in improving the
marketability of land titles within the limited area of its operation,
but at best it is only a partial remedy. It does not purport to deal
with such problems as unreleased mortgages or the period over which
a title must be free from serious defects in order to be marketable.
Nor does it affect presently existing conditions and restrictions which
4 An effective statute of this type is that of Nebraska. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
see. 76-258 (1950).
5 Basye, op. cit. supra note 2 at 547-48 (1953).
6 1 American Law of Property 108 (Casner ed. 1952).
7 Minn. Stat. sec. 500.20 (1953). See Goldstein, "fights of Entry and Pos-
sibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 284
(1940). Such legislation has been held unconstitutional when applied retro-
actively to reverter provisions, despite the inclusion of a saving clause allowing
one year in which to bring an action thereon. Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d
727 (Fla. 1954).
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appear substantial of record but which may, in fact, have been long
since abandoned or forgotten.
It is believed that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had such legisla-
tion as this in mind when, in an opinion handed down in 1953, it
suggested discussion by the bar of the problems presented by clauses
of forfeiture and reversion and "possible remedial legislation.", Ken-
tucky undoubtedly needs remedial legislation, but such legislation
must accomplish more than does any one of the specialized statutes
thus far discussed if it is to materially improve the marketability of
land titles.
Kentucky has not been alone in feeling the effects of the mounting
volume of land records and an increasing number of unmarketable
tiles. But while Kentucky's efforts at remedial legislation have been
almost nil, the majority of states have at least tried to do something to
improve the situation. Unfortunately, however, most of their efforts
have been in the area of limitation and curative statutes, which most
authorities agree are not the complete answer to the problem of
marketability.9 Such statutes leave the conveyancer with no criteria
by which to determine whether a specific title is marketable when it is
subject to ascertained enforceable interests of record at any point in
the chain of title from its inception to the present.
This problem of title evaluation has prompted the bar associations
of some of the states to adopt recommended standards on which to
base a title appraisal.
Title Standards
Title standards are recognized standards of appraisal to be applied
to the real estate title in determining its marketability. They contribute
to uniformity in the evaluation of titles and tend to dispel the fear of
the conveyancer that future opinion might be at variance with his own.
Connecticut was the first state to adopt title standards on a state-
wide basis. In 1938 the Connecticut Bar Association, after much
study and discussion by the bar, published a statement of 57 frequently
recurring problems of title practice with a recommendation as to
whether each problem should be treated as a defect or could be
ignored, and a discussion of the basis of the recommendation."0
In 1939 the American Bar Association sponsored a movement for
the adoption of such standards in all states where the title opinion
8 Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W. 2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953).
9 Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure," 47 Mich. L. Rev. 935, 942
(1949); note, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 887 (1942); Payne, "The Crisis in Convey-
ancing," 19 Mo. L. Rev. 214, 221-222 (1954).
10 12 Conn. S.B.J. 100 (1938).
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method is employed." Nebraska adopted such standards in 1939, and
a dozen or more other states have since been added to the growing
list. In 1947 the Nebraska legislature adopted as law the entire set of
standards as promulgated by the Nebraska Bar Association, giving
the Nebraska conveyancer reliable criteria for the appraisal of a title.12
He knows, for example, that "Where a mortgage in the chain of title
has been properly foreclosed, the lack of a clerk's certificate of satis-
faction of such mortgage should not be treated as a defect in title."13
Such legislatively adopted title standards can be a potent force in
simplifying the problem of title appraisal, and would be highly desir-
able in any jurisdiction where more comprehensive legislation cannot
be had.
Marketable Title Acts
In recent years, several of the midwestern states have undertaken
a comprehensive legislative overhaul of their conveyancing law. The
backbone of such reform has, in each instance, been a "marketable title
act." Such an act is based on the idea that public policy does not
demand that every outstanding interest, once it appears of record,
should remain as a permanent clog on the title, and that a complete
appraisal of a title should be possible from an examination of its
recent history. This means that claims or interests having an origin
prior to that period of recent history, and not appearing in the record
of that history, would be absolutely barred. To insure that a claim
not be barred the claimant may, under such statutes, renew his claim
of record by filing a simple notice of its existence and by periodic
renewal, so that a search of the records for the stated period over
which titles must be examined would disclose the notice and the
existence of the claim. This is generally felt to be a reasonable require-
ment in the furtherance of the desirable social end of improving the
marketability of land titles and simplifying the problem of title search
and evaluation.
Iowa, in 1919, was the first state to adopt such legislation. In 1941
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin passed similar acts. Minnesota fol-
lowed in 1943 and Michigan in 1945. Indiana revised her statute in
1947, and in the same year South Dakota and Nebraska passed acts
patterned after the Michigan legislation. North Dakota also took the
11 Proc. See. of Real Prop., Prob. & Trust Law (A.B.A.), "Report of Com-
mittee on Standards for Title Opinions," 130 (1939).12 Neb. Rev. Stat. sees. 76-601, 76-644 (Reissue of 1950).
13 Id. sec. 76-621.
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Michigan act as a model when her statute was passed in 1951.14 Some
of these acts were not as carefully drafted as they might have been,
and could very well be found to be unconstitutional.' 5
The Michigan act is typical of, and often has been the model for,
the later and better legislation of this type. The statute, in effect,
declares that one who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any
interest in land for 40 years shall at the end of such period be deemed
to have a marketable record title, subject only to such claims thereto
and defects of title as are preserved by other provisions of the statute
or are contained in the chain of record title during such 40 years. All
outstanding interests more than 40 years old are extinguished by the
statute unless a notice of the existence of such interest is recorded
within the 40 year period, and a good record title for 40 years is
declared to be a marketable one.' 6
The constitutionality of legislation such as that of Michigan would
seem to be clearly sustainable. It is true that property interests are
destroyed in some cases, but only when the owner of such interest has
failed to comply with a reasonable requirement for preserving it, viz.
the filing of a simple notice of its existence.
In holding the act of that state constitutional, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota said:
It is apparent from the recordation provisions of the 40-year
statute which we are considering that the legislature did not intend
to arbitrarily wipe out old claims and interests without affording a
means of preserving them and giving a reasonable period of time
within which to take the necessary steps to accomplish that purpose.
The recordation provisions of the act provide for a simple and
easy method by which the owner of an old interest may preserve it. If
he fails to take the step of filing the notice as provided, he has only
himself to blame if his interest is extinguished.lT
The court went on to say, with respect to the nine-month period
between the passage of the act and the date of its effectiveness as a
bar, during which period existing interests over 40 years old must
14These statutes are: Bums Ind. Stat. secs. -628 to 2-687 (Supp. 1957);
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 83, see. 10a (1957); Iowa Code secs. 614.17 to 614.20 (1954);
Mich. Comp. Laws sees. 565.101-565.109 (1948), as amended Mich. Comp. Laws
see. 565.104 (Supp. 1954); Minn. Stat. see. 541.023 (1953); Neb. Rev. Stat. sees.
76-288 to 76-298 (1950); N.D. Rev. Code secs. 47-19A01 to 47-19AI1 (Supp.
1953); S.D. Code sees. 51.16B01-51.16B12 (Supp. 1952); Wis. Stat. sec. 330.15(1955).
15 There would seem to be a real question as to the constitutionality of the
present Indiana act which requires the commencement of an action within one
year from the filing of the preserving notice. It is difficult to see how one could
commence an action pursuant to a claim which has not become possessory or
otherwise matured.
16 Mich. Comp. Laws sees. 565.101-565.109 (1948), as amended Mich. Comp.
Laws sec. 565.104 (Supp. 1954).
17 Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 817 (Minn. 1957).
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have been recorded, that "No one has a vested right in any particular
remedy and the legislature may change or modify the existing remedies
for the enforcement and protection of the contract rights as long as an
adequate remedy remains."' 8
The Supreme Court of the United States held constitutional an
amendment which reduced from 20 years to one year and nine months
the time allowed for commencement of an action in the case of exist-
ing causes of action.' 9
Writers in this area of property law share the opinion of the Min-
nesota court as to the constitutionality of these acts so long as they
do not commit the error of the Indiana legislation in requiring that
an action be brought whether or not one has matured.20
Some of the states have created undesirable exemptions in their
marketable title acts in favor of certain persons or interests. To allow
such exemptions is to require the conveyancer to search the entire
history of the title to determine whether it is subject to such exempted
interests or other claims by such exempted persons. Obviously, this
is inconsistent with the whole purpose of such legislation, and seriously
impairs its effectiveness. For these and other reasons, the later acts
seem to be more desirable. Michigan would seem to have profited
from the experience of the states which preceded her into this area,
and is generally conceded to have the preferable statute. The authori-
ties in the field are enthusiastic in their praise of the marketable title
acts generally, and they often single out the Michigan statute as the
ideal example of this type of legislation.21
Suggested Legislation for Kentucky
Few would take issue with the statement of the Kentucky Court
to the effect that old claims present ". . . a troublesome and growing
problem in real estate law as to what steps, if any, should be taken
to clear titles . .. "22 However, most persons conversant with the
problem would omit the "if any" and emphatically assert that some-
thing must be done. Professor Simes has stated that "it should be
reasonably apparent that something more than case law is necessary
to remove stale restrictions on the use of land." He went on to say,
18 Id. at 821.
19 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877).2 0 See especially Aigler, "Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts," 50 Mich.
L. Rev. 185 (1951).214 American Law of Property 834 (Casner ed. 1952); Basye, "Streamlining
Conveyancing Procedure," 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1097 (1949); 2 Patton on Titles sec.
563 (2d ed. 1957); Spies, "A Critique of Conveyancing," 38 Va. L. Rev. 245(1952).
22 Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W. 2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953).
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"The elimination of stale restrictions on the use of land is a problem
that becomes more acute with every passing year. And the only ade-
quate solution is well-drawN- legislation."23
Statutory reform in Kentucky, when it comes, should accomplish
four things: (1) It should define marketable title with such precision
as will permit of just application by the courts and reliable predict-
ability by the lawyer-conveyancer. (2) It should impose fixed limits
of duration for which conditions and restrictions can be created, but
it should not operate retroactively in this respect except as to those
conditions and restrictions which are or shall become merely nominal.
(3) It should, except for clearly observable easements, bar any action
on any claim that depends upon any act or omission that occurred
more than 40 years prior, unless some simple step has been taken to
preserve such claim, and (4) It should effectively cure purely tech-
nical defects of record after the lapse of a stated period of time.
Conceding the need for legislation, and assuming the desirability
of the foregoing objectives, what exactly, in terms should the Kentucky
legislature enact?
In an area of the law so replete with possible adverse consequences
as this, it is advisable to move carefully and to benefit by the experi-
ence of other jurisdictions. No one section of any legislation under-
taken should purport to incorporate all of the assumed requisites.
Rather, it should probably be set out in three new sections of the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes, which sections would operate independently
of, yet complement, each other.
One section should deal with the limitation of the duration of
which conditions and restrictions may be breated. This statute is
needed to preclude the possibility that restrictions, once created, could
be perpetuated indefinitely as a clog on the title by keeping a current
notice filed. The limitation would apply to grants involving conditions,
restrictions, covenants, or servitudes of any description whatever.24
In the accomplishment of this objective, it is believed that no
legislature could do better than adopt the applicable Minnesota
statute. This statute, with minor changes, is reproduced below, and
as changed is suggested for enactment by the Kentucky legislature:
381.- Defeasible Estates. (1) Normal conditions and
limitations. When any conditions annexed to a grant, devise or con-
23 Simes, "Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Use of Land," Proc. See.
of Real Prop., Prob. & Trust Law (A.B.A.) 4 at 7, 12 (1954).
24 It is felt that the application of such a statute to restrictive convenants and
equitable servitudes, which the law favors, is justified in view of the universal
acceptance and use of zoning laws which are a more desirable and more flexible
method of controlling the use of land.
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veyance of land are, or shall become, merely nominal, and of no
actual and substantial benefit to the party or parties to whom or in
whose favor they are to be performed, they may be wholly dis-
regarded; and a failure to perform the same shall in no case operate
as a basis of forfeiture of the lands subject thereto.
(2) Restriction of duration of condition. All covenants, condi-
tions, (possibilities of reverter, servitudes,) or restrictions hereafter
created by any other means, by which the title or use of real property
is affected, shall cease to be valid and operative (40) years after the
date of the deed, or other instrument, or the date of the probate of
the will, creating them; and after such period of time they may be
wholly disregarded.
(3) Time to assert power of termination. Hereafter any right
to reenter or to repossess land on account of breach made in a con-
dition subsequent shall be barred unless such right is asserted by
entry or action within six years after the happening of the breach
upon which such right is predicated.25
A second section of the statutes should constitute a marketable
title act which would be the real substance of the reform. It must be
carefully drafted if it is to be both effective and constitutional. 26
Kentucky should avail herself of the experience of other states and of
authorities in the field. That experience is crystallized in the Michigan
statute which has all the desirable features and, as originally drafted,
none of the undesirable features of similar legislation. Accordingly,
it is suggested that the legislature should enact the original Michigan
legislation of 1945,27 with a slight modification of section 4 and no
25 Minn. Stat. sec. 500.20 (1953). Those portions of subsection (2) within
parentheses represent changes from the Minnesota act. Possibilities of reverter
and servitudes are expressly included in order to rule out the possibility of their
being excluded by construction. See Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 7. The duration
for which the interests may be created is changed from 30 to 40 years to better
accord with other proposed legislation.2 6 Illustrative of the need for care in drafting such legislation is the fact that
the Nebraska act, supra note 14, was modeled after that of Michigan, infra note
27; yet, sec. 76-290 of the Nebraska act requires only that a notice of the claim be
filed within 23 years after the instrument concerned is recorded in order for a sub-
sequent action to be brought thereon. Thus a single recording of a notice would
seem to preserve the interest indefinitely unless barred on some basis outside the
act, though the basic idea behind such recording of notice is that it must have
been recorded within the stated period prior to the assertion of the remedy there-
for. Substantially the same undesirable feature was introduced into the Minnesota
statute by a 1947 amendment. The feature in the Minnesota act is criticized in
Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure," 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1097, 1118
(1949).
-7 PUBLIC Act of Michigan, No. 200, approved May 17, 1945, provides:
AN ACT to define a marketable record title to an interest in land;
to require the filing of notices of claim of interest in such land in cer-
tain cases within a definite period of time and to require the recording
thereof; to make invalid and of no force or effect all claims with
respect to the land affected thereby where no such notices of claim
of interest are filed within the required period; to provide for certain
penalties for filing slanderous notices of claim of interest, and to pro-
ide certain exceptions to the applicability and operation thereof.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
(footnote continued on next page)
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Section 1. Any person, having the legal capacity to own land
in this state, who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any
interest in land for 40 years, shall at the end of such period be deemed
to have a marketable record title to such interest, subject only to such
claims thereto and defects of title as are not extinguished or barred
by application of the provisions of succeeding sections of this act and
subject also to such interests and defects as are inherent in the pro-
visions and limitations contained in the muniments of which such
chain of record title is formed and which have been recorded during
said 40 year period: Provided, however, That no one shall be deemed
to have such a marketable record title by reason of the terms of this
act, if the land in which such interest exists is in the hostile possession
of another.
Sec. 2. A person shall be deemed to have the unbroken chain
of title to an interest in land as such terms are used in the preceding
section when the official public records disclose:
(a) A conveyance or other title transaction not less than 40 years
in the past, which said conveyance or other title transaction purports
to create such interest in such person, with nothing appearing of
record purporting to divest such person of such purported interest; or,
(b) A conveyance or other title transaction not less than 40
years in the past, which said conveyance or other title transaction
purports to create such interest in some other person and other con-
veyances or title transactions of record by which such purported in-
terest has become vested in the person first referred to in this section,
with nothing appearing of record purporting to divest the person first
referred to in this section of such purported interest.
Sec. 3. Such marketable title shall be held by such person and
shall be taken by his successors in interest free and clear of any and
all interests, claims, and charges whatsoever the existence of which
depends in whole or in part upon any act, transaction, event, or
omission that occurred prior to such 40 year period, and all such in-
terest, claims, and charges are hereby declared to be null and void
and of no effect whatever at law or in equity: Provided, however,
That any such interest, claim, or charge may be preserved and kept
effective by filing for record during such 40 year period, a notice in
writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claims.
No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone
shall suspend the running of said 40 year period. For the purpose of
recording notices of claim for homestead interests the date from which
the 40 year period shall run shall be the date of recording of the in-
strument, non-joinder in which is the basis for such claim. Such notice
may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting
on behalf of any claimant who is:
(a) Under a disability,
(b) Unable to assert a claim on his own behalf,
(C) One of a class but whose identity cannot be established or
is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of claim for record.
Sec. 4. This act shall not be applied to bar any lessor or his
successor as reversioner of his right to possession on the expiration of
any lease, (or to bar or extinguish any easement, or interest in the
nature of an easement, the existence of which is clearly observable by
physical evidences of its use,) by reason of failure to file the notice
herein required. Nor shall this act be deemed to affect any right,
title or interest in land owned by the United States.
Sec. 5. To be effective and to be entitled to record the notice
above referred to shall contain an accurate and full description of
all the land affected by such notice which description shall be set
forth in particular terms and not by general inclusions. Such notice
(footnote continued on next page)
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shall be filed for record in the register of deeds office of the county
or counties where the land described therein is situated. The register
of deeds of each county shall accept all such notices presented to him
which describe land located in the county in which he serves and
shall enter and record full copies thereof in the same way that deeds
and other instruments are recorded and each register shall be entitled
to charge the same fees for the recording thereof as are charged for
recording deeds. In indexing such notices in his office each register
shall enter such notices under the grantee indexes of deeds under
the names of the claimants appearing in such notices.
Sec. 6. This act shall be construed to effect the legislative pur-
pose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing
persons dealing with the record title owner, as defined herein, to rely
on the record title covering a period of not more than 40 years prior
to the date of such dealing and to that end to extinguish all claims
that affect or may affect the interest thus dealt with, the existence of
which claims arises out of or depends upon any act, transaction, event
or omission antedating such 40 year period, unless within such 40
year period a notice of claim as provided in section 3 hereof shall
have been duly filed for record. The claims hereby extinguished shall
mean any and all interests of any nature whatever, however de-
nominated, and whether such claims are asserted by a person sui juris
or under disability, whether such person is within or without the
state, and whether such person is natural or corporate, or private or
governmental.
Sec. 7. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to extend
the periods for the bringing of an action or for the doing of an otherrequired act under any existing statutes of limitation nor to affect the
operation of any existing acts governing the effect of the recording or
of the failure to record any instruments affecting land nor to affect
the operation of Act No. 216 of the Public Acts of 1929 nor of ActNo. 58 of the Public Acts of 1917 as amended by Act No. 105 of the
Public Acts of 1939.
Sec. 8. No person shall use the privilege of filing notices here-under for the purpose of slandering the title to land, and in any action
brought for the purpose of quieting tt o land, f the court shall find
that any person has filed a claim for that reason only, he shall award
the plaintiff all the costs of such action, including such attorney fees asthe court may allow to the plaintiff, and in addition, shall decree
that the defendant asserting such claim shall pay to plaintiff all
damages that plaintiff may have sustained as the result of such noticeof claim having been so filed for record.
Sec. 9. No interest, claim or charge shall be barred by the pro-visions of section 3 of this act until the lapse of 1 year from its ef-
fetive date, and any interest, claim or charge that would otherwise
be barred by said section 3 may be preserved and kept effective by
the filing of a notice of claim as required by this act during the said1 year period.
The foregoing is a reproduction of the statute as it was originaly enacted
and as it appears in Aigler, "Clearing of Land Titles-A Statutory Step," 44 Mich.
L. Rev. 45 (1945). For the act in its present form, see supra note 16. The
original legislation is preferred because subsequent amendments have introduced
undesirable exceptions into section 4 and created a certain confusion of meaning
therein. See Aigler, "Coastitutionality of Marketable Title Acts," 50 Mich. L. Rev.185(1951). The above portion of section 4 within parentheses represents an ad-dition to th original Michigan legislation. It is felt to be desirable to exclude
from the operation of the act easements as to which there is no question of notice
in order to avoid imposing on public utilities the tremendous burden of keepinginnumerable preserving notices current. Sections 5 and 7 would require slight
changes to compensate for jurisdictional differences.
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other changes except as are necessary to compensate for jurisdictional
differences.
A final suggested statute should consist of a curative act which
would, after the lapse of perhaps ten (or even five) years, validate
documents of record which fail, for some technical reason only, to
carry into legal effect the intentions of the parties. Such a statute is
needed to operate within the proposed 40 year period of the market-
able title act to correct technical defects in the record chain of title on
which marketability would depend. The statute should not operate
immediately upon record defects, however, as this would be equivalent
to offering an alternative method for making an effective conveyance,
and its effect would be to condone if not to encourage the commission
of errors.2 8 A satisfactory curative act might be worded as follows:
When any instrument of writing, in any manner affecting
or purporting to affect the title to real estate, has been, or may here-
after be recorded for a period of ten years in the office of the clerk
of the county wherein such real estate is situated, and such instrument,
or the record thereof, because of defect, irregularity or omission, fails
to comply in any respect with any statutory requirement or require-
ments relating to the execution, attestation, acknowledgment, or re-
cording, such instrument and the record thereof shall, notwithstanding
any or all of such defects, irregularities and omissions, be fully legal,
valid, binding and effectual for all purposes to the same extent as
though such instrument had, in the first instance, been in all respects
duly executed, attested, acknowledged and recorded.20
Conclusion
It is readily admitted that there are other possible solutions to the
problems here discussed. Some of those, such as the Torrens system
of title registration30 and tract index recording system, might even
bring longer lasting and better results. They are not discussed here
because adoption of either would necessitate the expenditure of public
funds in amounts which many feel would not be justified by the added
benefits produced, especially since much improvement can be made
within the framework of the present recording system. Accordingly,
the basic premise of this note has been that such reform as is under-
taken must be attempted within the present recording system.
It is to be hoped that the legislature, through its Legislative Re-
search Commission, will see fit to undertake a study of the very real
2 8 Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure," 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1097
(1949).
29 This is, with minor variations, an exact reproduction of Neb. Rev. Stat. sec.
76-258 (1950).
30 For an excellent discussion of the Torrens system and its operation, see
Patton, "The Torrens System of Land Title Registration," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 519
(1935).
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problems which have been touched upon above. These problems bear
promise of becoming more real with each new year of legislative in-
activity and the accompanying annual volume of new land records
and newly imposed incumbrances.
The benefits to be derived from such a program of reform as is
suggested in this note are apparent and numerous. They will inure
to the advantage of the lawyer-conveyancer through simplified pro-
cedures, to the property owner in a more secure title, and to society
at large in the reduction of litigation.
Robert E. Adams
